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ABSTRACT
We theoretically investigate the interrelationship between economic inequality and the
exposure to pollutants during the course of economic development. Environmental pollu-
tion adversely affects children’s probability to survive to adulthood, reduces thus parental
expenditures on child quality and increases the number of births necessary to achieve a
desired family size. Children’s exposure to environmental pollution is determined by eco-
nomic inequality because wealthier households live in cleaner areas which shapes then
differences in the level of human capital per child. This is the key mechanism through
which environmental conditions impose a growth drag on the economy. Our theory pro-
vides a candidate explanation for: (i) The hump-shaped evolution of child mortality ratios
between cleaner and more polluted areas during the course of economic development, and
(ii) the observed positive correlation between inequality and the concentration of pollu-
tants at the local level.
2
1. INTRODUCTION
The Industrial Revolution induced an immense increase in both economic activity and
environmental pollution. While the latter adversely affected children’s health status and
parents’ incentives to invest in child quality, the second phase of the Industrial Revolution
was marked by massive investments in children’s education inducing a decline in fertility
rates and sustained economic growth (see f.e. Galor, 2011). Simultaneously, the decline
in fertility rates was associated with a decline in child mortality rates that implied a
lower number of births necessary to achieve a desired family size leaving eventually more
resources available for expenditures on child quality (Strulik, 2004, 2008).
In this paper, we argue that the transition to reduced fertility rates and increasing parental
expenditures on education per child requires public policies that mitigate the adverse im-
pact of production on children’s health. These policies, however, require the support
of pivotal social groups. Agents’ willingness to support these policies, in turn, is pre-
dominantly driven by their exposure to pollutants and their disposable incomes. The
consideration of this dimension is crucial since wealthier households live in cleaner ar-
eas (see for example Tiebout, 1956, and Roback, 1982) and face therefore lower child
mortality rates.1 Consequently, richer households exhibit lower fertility rates and invest
more in education which reinforces the impact of inequality on differential fertility (de la
Croix and Doepke, 2003). A lower exposure to pollutants reduces ceteris paribus richer
agents’ willingness to pay for tax-financed abatement measures. Poorer agents, on the
other hand, may exhibit an even lower willingness to pay if their incomes are sufficiently
low forcing them to put a stronger emphasis on subsistence needs rather than on environ-
mental quality. In earlier stages of economic development, the adverse effects of pollution
would then be highest if the pivotal social group is poor and has no political power to
tax richer agents. In more advanced stages of economic development even poorer agents’
disposable incomes are sufficiently high allowing them to support tax-financed abatement
measures, potentially exceeding the preferred abatement level of the rich which are less
exposed to pollutants.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold: (i) on a theoretical level we
analyze how inequality shapes the preferences for tax-financed abatement measures and
parental incentives to invest in their children’s education. (ii) By doing so this paper
provides along an empirical dimension a candidate explanation for a) the hump-shaped
evolution of child mortality ratios between areas that are subject to different degrees of
environmental pollution as illustrated in Figure 1, and b) the positive cross-country cor-
relation between economic inequality and pollution at the local level, see Figure 2(a).
We apply an overlapping generations (OLG) model with endogenous fertility and a hier-
archy of needs due to subsistence consumption. The probability to survive to adulthood
depends positively on the stage of economic development and disposable incomes of house-
holds but is adversely affected by environmental pollution. An increase in the probability
to survive to adulthood reduces the number of births necessary to achieve a desired family
size and leaves more resources available for educating the surviving children. Thus, eco-
nomic development may be conducive for children’s survival probabilities, but may also
generate via pollution an adverse impact on children’s probability to survive to adulthood.
The exposure to pollutants determined by economic inequality triggers again children’s
probability to survive to adulthood and the willingness of parents to invest in education.
1Exposure to pollution depends thus on economic wealth although medical knowledge about the
impact of pollution on health was limited at earlier stages of economic development. The ”miasma”

















Figure 1: Ratio of child mortality rates in urban and rural regions (Bairoch, 1988)
This is the key mechanism of our model through which environmental conditions may
impose a growth drag on the economy.
Only a few papers analyze the interaction between environmental aspects and health
within an OLG framework (Mariani, Perez-Baharona, and Raffin, 2010; Varvarigos, 2010).
Moreover, these papers relate longevity and environmental quality to poverty traps, while
this paper emphasizes the adverse impact of pollution on children’s health and the result-
ing prospects for economic growth.2 Likewise, endogenous population dynamics has been
linked to our best knowledge to the depletion of non-renewable resources only (see for
example Bretschger, 2013; Peretto and Valente, 2015; Schaefer, 2014), but not to envi-
ronmental pollution. On a conceptual level, this paper builds on seminal works by Glomm
and Ravikumar (1992) which is the workhorse in the literature related to OLG models
with endogenous human capital formation and de la Croix and Doepke (2003, 2004) who
established an analytical framework regarding the interaction between fertility, educa-
tion and inequality. Our research is also related to a seminal paper by Ehrlich and Lui
(1991) who analyze parents investments in their children to achieve old-age support and
emotional compensation from them. We abstract from intergenerational trade but take
account for inequality and endogenous improvements in child mortality in response to
tax-finance abatement measures. With respect to the relationship between health and
fertility this paper is also related to Strulik (2004, 2008).3
The nexus between inequality, health, and residential exposure to pollutants has been
documented impressively by economic historians (Szreter, 1997). Urban populations of-
ten had no access to clean water. Fresh water was used for commercial purposes while
the new entrepreneurial class saw no point in spending money for sanitation and sewage
treatment plants which had no obvious commercial benefit (Hassan, 1985). Pollution from
smoke and other factory discharges contaminated the atmosphere and the environment.
2Related to Mariani et al. (2010) is Ono and Maeda (2001) and Jouvet et al. (2010).
3Strulik, Prettner and Prskawetz (2013) also offer an OLG model with endogenous education and
fertility but focus on historical and future trends in R&D-based growth.
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Schwartz (2004) demonstrates that especially children tend to be more vulnerable as a
result of early life exposure to pollutants leading directly to increased child mortality or
indirectly through changes in birth outcomes that translate into higher mortality risks
later in life. In developed countries, this effect is significant but less pronounced com-
pared to earlier stages of economic development (see Chay and Greenstone, 2003, Currie
and Neidell, 2005, and Currie et al., 2009).4 The initially adverse impact of economic
development on children’s survival probabilities is impressively documented by Figure 1.
In the nineteens century, child mortality rates in cities relative to rural areas increased
in Sweden and Norway rapidly to a 1.6 ratio at the end of the century and experienced
a decline to a ratio smaller than one during the first quarter of the 20th century only.5
The hump-shaped pattern applies also for richer agents which moved to the periphery of
cities compared to poorer groups of the society living in the cities close to the produc-
tion centers and emission sources. In this paper, we explain the hump-shaped evolution
of child mortality differentials by differences in the residential exposure to pollutants.
Poorer households living in more polluted areas exhibit lower human capital endowments
compared to richer households living in less polluted areas. Thus poorer households invest
less in child quality while their children face a lower probability to survive to adulthood.
Consequently, mortality differentials increase if production and pollution increase. In
later phases of economic development, the mortality differentials close again because even
poorer households exhibit higher incomes and increase their expenditures on health and
nutrition. This process will be reinforced by the implementation of tax-financed abate-
ment measures. Figure 2(b) and (c) support the arguments of our theory, in the sense
that pollution interferes with the quality quantity trade-off; see also Figure 2(d) which
illustrates the quality quantity trade-off as such.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce our over-
lapping generations framework. In Section 3, we discuss inequality with respect to agents’
human capital endowments and with respect to their exposure to pollutants. Section 4
performs numerical experiments analyzing the impact of inequality on mortality differen-
tials and of pollution on inequality. Moreover, we explore there the interaction between
inequality, exposure to pollutants and preferences for tax-financed abatement measures.
Finally, Section 5 provides a summary and concludes.
2. THE MODEL
2.1. Human Activities and Pollution
In this setting, time is discrete, indexed by t and ranges from 0 to ∞. A large number of
firms produce aggregate output (Yt) using a constant returns to scale technology of Cobb-
Douglas type, where Kt denotes aggregate physical capital and H
Y
t aggregate effective
4For an extensive overview, see Graff Zivin and Neidell (2013).
5Bairoch (1988) discusses very similar developments for other European countries. Szreter (1997)
documents that rapid urbanization associated with the Industrial Revolution induced higher mortality
rates in cities than in the countryside, and a decline in overall life expectancy. In addition Hainse (2004)
and Komlos (1998) provide evidence for increased morbidity over the same period of time.
6Particulate matter concentrations refer to fine suspended particulates less than 10 microns in diameter
(PM10) that are capable of penetrating deep into the respiratory tract and causing significant health
damage. Data for countries and aggregates for regions and income groups are urban-population weighted
PM10 levels in residential areas of cities with more than 100,000 residents. The estimates represent
the average annual exposure level of the average urban resident to outdoor particulate matter. The
state of a country’s technology and pollution controls is an important determinant of particulate matter
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Figure 2: Cross-country correlations between (a) inequality and pollution (particulate
matter6), (b) pollution and schooling, (c) pollution and fertility, and (d) schooling and
fertility. Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators, 2013)
labor employed in production, such that
Yt = A · (Kt)α(HYt )1−α, (1)
with A > 0, α ∈ (0, 1).
Production generates emissions (Et) which may be attenuated by abatement measures
(Mt) financed by a proportional tax, 0 ≤ τt < 1, on households’ income. Ordas Criado et
al. (2011) speak in this context about defensive expenditures devoted to activities that
reduce the emissions of the production sector. In order to allow for balanced growth and







) = (b2 − b3τt)
Yt
Ht
, b2, b3 > 0, (2)
where b2 reflects the impact of production on the environment, b3 the productivity of
abatement measures, and Ht aggregate human capital. Eq.(2) allows for balanced growth
and captures at the same time the notion that it becomes increasingly difficult to abate as
the economy develops. Note that the tax rate (τt) is endogenous, not necessarily positive,
and dependent on the preferences of a pivotal agent (the political decision problem will be
introduced in Section 2.3). Moreover, the environment is adversely affected by population
size (Nt) which captures the adverse effect of population density and congestion on the
environment, an effect which is not necessarily reflected by aggregate output since the
latter depends on aggregate effective labor supply. Finally, the environment regenerates
at a constant rate (0 ≤ b1 ≤ 1) per period of time. Therefore, the stock of pollutants
evolves in spirit of John and Pecchenino (1994) over time according to








with b4 > 0 reflecting the adverse impact of population on the environment.
7
2.2. Households
Consider an economy populated by overlapping generations. Each generation consists
of a large number of households indexed by i which differ in terms of their levels of
human capital and their exposure to pollutants introduced further below. Households
live for two periods: childhood and adulthood. All economically relevant decisions are
made in the adult period of life. Adult households care about the number of children
(nit) they wish to raise and the quality per child reflected by their health status (s
i
t) as
well as the level of human capital per child (hit+1). Hence, parents do not care about
their descendants utility but receive a warm glow of giving (Andreoni, 1989). Moreover,
parents’ expenditures on children are motivated by the desire for having ”higher quality”
children (Becker, 1960). Looking at estimates of values for children’s health indicates that
parents behave considerably altruistic with respect to their children’s health (Agee and
Crocker, 2001; Liu et al., 2000; Dickie and Ulery, 2001).
hit+1 depends on education (e
i
t), the parental level of human capital (h
i
t) and the level of
human capital per teacher in the education sector (hTt )






η ∈ (0, 1) reflects the impact of education on the level of human capital. ν ∈ (0, 1) denotes
the intergenerational transmission of human capital or the intergenerational persistence
between parental human capital and the level of human capital per child (see for example
Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992, and de la Croix and Doepke, 2003;2004). The parameter
ε > 0 will allow for eit = 0.












> 0 if πit < 1. Building on Strulik (2008), s
i
t is determined by an intrinsic
component (dit) which is endogenous to the household and an extrinsic component (π̄t)












intrinsic component is steered by parental expenditures on health and nutrition (dit).
The extrinsic component (π̄t), in turn, is positively affected by the state of economic
development reflected by the average stock of human capital (hmt ), but adversely affected
by environmental pollution (Pt), i.e. π̄t = π̄t(h
m
t , Pt). We therefore depart from Strulik
(2008) along two dimensions: 1) The extrinsic component is determined by the willingness
to support tax-financed abatement measures. 2) The components driving π̄t depend on
economic inequality.9
7Thus a balanced growth path with a constant Yt/Ht-ratio is characterized by a non-increasing pollu-
tion stock, if the growth rate of the population is lower than the growth rate of human capital which is
empirically for advanced economies a plausible scenario. Usually the literature and also this paper ana-
lyzes the regulation of a single pollutant and abstracts from complementary or substitutive relationships
between different kinds of pollutants. An economically reasonable steady state requires the compatibility
of economic growth with non-declining environmental quality such that in general pollution approaches
a finite steady state level (see for example Ordas Criado et al., 2011; Brock and Taylor, 2005 and 2010;
Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995).
8This disaggregation of survival probabilities stems from biology, for example the intrinsic component
is nutrition while the extrinsic component is reflected by the natural environment, let’s say temperature
(see Strulik, 2008 for further details).
9A growing body of literature has analyzed the hump-shaped relationship between the provision of
health care and endogenous growth within the context of OLG frameworks (Kuhn and Prettner, 2016;
Schneider and Winkler, 2010; Aisa and Pueyo, 2004;2006). We consider private expenditures on health
and nutrition and emphasize the importance of tax-financed abatement measures.
7
The relationship between the extrinsic and the intrinsic component of children’s health
status is formalized as follows (we denote steady state values by an asterisk):
The extrinsic survival component (π̄t) is increasing and concave in the stage of economic
development reflected by the average level of human capital (hmt ). In contrast π̄t is
declining and convex in the level of pollutants (Pt) such that
(a) π̄t = π̄(h
m














(b) π̄t(0, Pt) = 0, limPt→∞ π̄t(h
m
t , Pt) = 0, π̄t(h
m
t , 0) < ∞ and limhmt →∞ π̄t(hmt , Pt) =
π̄∗ < 1.
10
The health status (sit) determines the survival probability (π
i
t) of a child born in household
i via parental expenditures on health and nutrition (dit), the intrinsic component. The
productivity of dit is improved by the extrinsic survival component (π̄t), if d
i
t exceeds a








π̄t , if dit > d̃, (6)
where λ > 0 represents a productivity parameter and π̄0 > 0 is a constant parameter,
with 0 < π̄0 < π̄t < 1 ∀ t. Moreover, sit(0, π̄t) = 0. Children’s probability to survive to
adulthood is determined by πit = min{1; sit(dit, π̄t)}, such that
πit(s
i
t) ∈ [0, 1]. (7)
In addition to nit and children’s quality, adult agents care about their own level of consump-
tion (cit) above subsistence needs (c̄) and the amount of bequests per child (b
i
t). Agents
experience a disutility from the future level of pollution (Pt+1) such that preferences of a
member i of generation t that is born in t− 1 are specified as
uit = ln(c
i
t − c̄) + γ ln(nitqit) + ρ ln bit − µPt+1, (8)





β and β, γ, µ, ρ, c̄ > 0.11








t in the parental utility function implies that parents
derive utility out of the number of surviving offspring, such that agents are forced to
increase fertility whenever child mortality is high in order to achieve their desired family
size and vice versa. If πit = 1 parents derive utility out of an increasing health status of
their children.12
The presence of Pt+1 in the parental utility function captures some degree of altruism
10π̄∗ < 1 is necessary to assure reasonable solutions, in the sense that the weight of child quality is
smaller than the weight of quantity in the parental utility function.
11Pollution generating a negative externality on agents’ welfare has been analyzed within a Ramsey
framework by van der Ploeg and Withagen (1991), Gradus and Smulders (1993), Beltratti (1996) or
Xepapadeas (1997, Chapter 3). For further details see also Xepppadeas (2005). For endogenous growth
models see for example Grimaud (1999).






t) + β ln(h
i
t+1)]. In order to capture morbidity effects, we could
also associate the health status of children explicitly to the productivity in human capital accumulation
and labor productivity when adult. Further below we will see, however, that health improvements will
increase human capital accumulation, such that the implementation of morbidity would not yield any
further insights but increase the notational complexity.
8
with respect to the preservation of the environment for the next generation. We omit Pt
in the parental utility function for convenience since it would not alter the optimization
problem with respect to τt in the political process, because τt can only affect Pt+1 but
never Pt, see Eq. (3).
13
Denote post-tax variables by ”ˆ”, the budget constraint of an agent i endowed with one

















t, τt ∈ [0, 1), (9)
with ŷit = (1− τt)(wthit +Rtb
′i
t−1). wt and Rt represent the wage rate per effective unit of
labor and the return on capital.




t), with 0 < z < 1







t), where education is provided by an educational sector employing
teacher equipped with human capital hTt . Third, expenditures on health and nutrition (d
i
t),
and the level of bequests per child (bit). The subsequent lemma summarizes households’
optimal decisions - the proof can be found in the Online-Appendix.
Lemma 1 (Households’ decisions)
Adult agents maximize lifetime utility as given by (8) subject to the budget constraint
(9), and the evolution of human capital per child (4), while ignoring their impact on
the evolution of the aggregate pollution stock. Denote by xit =
hit
hTt
household i’s level of
human capital relative to hTt , then there exists a time varying threshold level of relative
human capital
x̃t =
(1− π̄t)γ − ρ
γβηz
ε, (10)
implying that eit = 0, if x
i
t ≤ x̃t or eit > 0, if xit > x̃it, where ∂x̃t∂π̄t < 0. Optimal decisions of
household i read






















γβηzxit − (γ(1− π̄t)− ρ)ε
γ(1− βη − π̄t)− ρ
, (13)
dit =
γπ̄t(z − εxit )












with γ(1− βη − π̄t)− ρ > 0.14
13Constant marginal disutility from pollution assures analytical tractability.
14The non-negativity constraint γ(1 − βη − π̄t) − ρ > 0 is a common feature in models dealing with
the quality-quantity trade-off: the weight of utility attached to the pure presence of children, γ, should
exceed the weight of children’s quality components in the parental utility function.
9





























with γ(1− π̄t)− ρ > 0.
Households spend a fraction 1
1+γ
of their post-tax income on consumption. The remain-
ing part ( γ
1+γ
) is spent on child rearing. Fertility (nit) is positively related to disposable
incomes, but it is negatively related to forgone wage earnings per child (zwth
i
t), negatively
associated to expenditures on child quality as captured by education (eit), expenditures
on health and nutrition (dit), and the level of bequests per child (b
i
t). All these variables
depend, for their part, positively on the level of parental relative human capital (xit),
and positively on the extrinsic component of children’s survival probability (π̄t). The fact
that the children’s quality vector depends on parental relative human capital endowments
allows us to study the evolution of the income dynamics by focusing on the evolution of
xit, only. The dependence of the quality vector on π̄t implies that favorable environmental
conditions raise the number of surviving children and reduce the desired level of fertility.
As a consequence, more resources are available for education, nutrition and bequests.
eit > 0 requires that parents’ relative human capital stock (x
i
t) exceeds the critical thresh-
old level x̃t as determined by (10). As a novel feature of our model, x̃t is time varying,
declining in the extrinsic survival component (π̄t) and dependent on the preference to sup-
port tax-financed abatement measures. Thus a high pollution stock lowers child quality
itself and increases x̃t. Everything else equal, a lower pollution stock implies that parents
with a lower xit are now able to invest in eduction. If x
i
t ≤ x̃t it follows that eit = 0 and
fertility is at the highest feasible value while bit and d
i
t reach their lowest feasible values,
see Lemma 1, item (ii).
At the beginning of the second period of life (adulthood), bequests of children that didn’t
survive to adulthood are equally redistributed within the family among the surviving







Now several points are worth being noticed: (i) for low levels of income, agents devote rel-
atively more resources to consumption in order to cover subsistence needs while expendi-
tures for fertility and child quality are low. During earlier stages of economic development
this mechanism is reenforced by a low hmt and thus a low π̄t. Consequently, probabilities
to survive to adulthood are low. Especially the critical threshold (x̃t) is relatively high
such that depending on the distribution of human capital only few households invest in
education for their offspring. Hence, income gains at this stage of economic development
are channeled towards an increase in fertility while the incentives to invest in child quality
are low. (ii) Agents characterized by xit > x̃t are willing to invest in education for their
offspring and contribute, by doing so, to a slow increase in the average stock of human
10
capital (hmt ). In this early phase of economic development, capital accumulation fueled
by bequests constitutes the major source of aggregate output growth. The increase in
hmt enhances the extrinsic survival probability of children (π̄t), while the increase in pro-
duction depletes environmental quality reflected by an increase in Pt. Thus, the increase
in production induces an offsetting effect on π̄t. (iii) The increase in incomes allows for
higher expenditures on health and nutrition enhancing c.p. children’s prospects to survive
to adulthood. Thus population growth may increase. Ultimately, the risk not to survive
to adulthood plays a declining role as the economy develops eventually accelerated by
the implementation of abatement measures. In view of declining mortality risks, parents
reduce fertility in order to achieve their desired family size and allocate more resources
towards child quality. Hence, population growth peaks, declines towards its steady state
value and follows the for industrialized countries well documented hump-shaped pattern.
The level of fertility and the pace of its decline depend on inequality and pollution.
2.3. Pollution abatement
We now introduce the endogenous emergence of abatement measures during the course of
economic development by implementing a simple and in the literature on income distri-
bution and institutions widely spread political process. The government sets a tax rate
0 ≤ τt < 1 that maximizes a pivotal agent’s (p) lifetime utility (8) given her optimal
decisions as specified by Lemma 1 and by recognizing the evolution of the pollution stock
(3). In an idealized democracy, we should consider the median-voter as the decisive agent.
If, in turn, the political system is biased towards the rich or the poor (Benabou, 1996;
Acemoglu, 2009), the median voter should be considered as a theoretical benchmark,
rather. Whether the position of the pivotal agent in the income distribution matters
for the implementation of pollution abatement, depends on the existence of subsistence
consumption, i.e. c̄ > 0 - for a poof, see the Online-Appendix.
Proposition 1 (Preferred tax rate)
The government maximizes lifetime utility (8) of a pivotal agent (p) given optimal deci-






t → τ pt . (21)















tHtYt[1 + γ(2 − π̄t − ρ)] + b23µ2c̄2Y 2t >
0 since 2 − π̄t − ρ > 0 under reasonable parameter restrictions. Moreover, the













< 0. Furthermore, τ pt = 0, if y
p
t ≤ ỹt, with ỹ =
c̄[−γ(1−ρ−π̄t)Ht−b3µYt]
[1+γ(π̄t+ρ)]Ht−b3µYt

































(iii) For c̄ ≥ 0, i.e. disregarded the existence of subsistence consumption, capital accu-
mulation increases the preferred tax rate, while human capital accumulation reduces











Due to the existence of subsistence consumption (c̄ > 0), the level of the tax rate (τ pt )
depends positively on the level of the pivotal agent’s income (ypt ), see item (i). Thus
environmental preferences are subject to a hierarchy of needs, in the sense that richer
agents prefer more abatement. On the other hand richer agents live in less polluted areas
which may reduce their willingness to pay, since the extrinsic component of their children’s
survival probabilities (π̄t) is higher. We will come back to the role of different exposures to
pollutants further below. If c̄ = 0 [item(ii)], the preferred tax rate would be the same for
all agents unless agents are exposed to different degrees of pollution reflected by a different
π̄t. Disregarded the existence of subsistence consumption, capital accumulation increases
the preferred tax rate since it increases the pollution stock and thus the marginal benefit
from taxation. On the other hand, human capital accumulation increases production but
reduces the capital intensity of production. Since the latter overcompensates the former,




















Figure 3: Evolution of relative human capital xit. AA-locus: evolution of x
i,A
t . BB-locus:
evolution of xi,Bt given {π̄At , π̄Bt }.
3. INEQUALITY AND REGIONAL SURVIVAL DIFFERENTIALS
We now allow for residential differences in the exposure to pollutants, for example due to
differences in the residential proximity to emission sources. Consider a population that
inhabits two areas denoted by A and B.
Lemma 2 (Residential differences in the exposure to pollutants)
Residents of region B are more exposed to pollutants stemming from the same emission
sources than region-A agents, such that the extrinsic component of region A’s children
exceeds the one of region B’s children, i.e. π̄At > π̄
B
t .
The evolution of relative human capital (xit) is decisive for individual decisions on child
quality (see Lemma 1) and thus the evolution of individual incomes and inequality over
time. Agents are allocated to region A or B according to their relative level of human
capital (xit): Agents with x
i
t above some threshold level x̃
crit live in region A while type-
B agents are characterized by xit ≤ x̃crit.15 The following proposition summarizes the
evolution of relative human capital xi,jt (j = A,B), in the two regions. The proof can be
found in the Online Appendix.
15We thus abstract from migration decisions (endogenous residential sorting) from more to less polluted
areas which would expand the structure of the model drastically without delivering further insights. The
essential extension requires a lifetime utility arbitrage condition between region A and B and the explicit
modeling of housing prices. Migration from B to A would increase housing prices there and establish a
stopping rule of migration flows with wealthier households living in A. As lifetime utility depends then on
the evolution of housing prices over the life cycle, the described approach is already close to intractability
in much simpler OLG frameworks, see Grossmann et al. (2017). Accordingly, x̃crit is exogenous. In line
with Roback (1982), differences in incomes across regions reflect differences in amenities associated with
the chosen location.
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Proposition 2 (Evolution of relative human capital in region A and B)












with a stationary and stable solution at xi,At = x
i,A
















1− βη − ρ− π̄At




where xi,Bt ≤ x̃crit. Moreover,
(a) xi,Bt+1 is affected by the extrinsic components of children’s survival probability
in the two regions, π̄jt , j = A,B. Thus, there exists a stable conditional steady
state xi,B∗ |{π̄At ,π̄Bt } in each period, t.
(b) In light of Lemma 2, it follows that
1−βη−ρ−π̄At
1−βη−ρ−π̄Bt
< 1, such that the xi,B−locus










π̄B∗ , the x




exceeds a critical threshold level, the B-locus is always below the 45-degree
line and relative human capital endowments in region B approach zero within
finite time.
We present the reasoning of Proposition 2 graphically in Figure 3. The evolution of xi,jt
(j = A,B) follows the A- or the B- locus, see (24) and (25). Both loci exhibit a stable
steady state and, because of ε > 0, to the left of it an unstable steady state. In Figure
3, we fixed the threshold level of relative human capital (x̃crit) to the conditional steady
state of population group B, i.e x̃crit = xi,B∗ |{π̄At ,π̄Bt }, such that the evolution of relative
human capital follows the solid gray line.16 The location of the B-locus is conditional on
the state of the extrinsic components of children’s survival probabilities as indicated by
the subscripts π̄jt , which are constant in the long run. Thus, the location of the B-locus
is time varying during the transition to the steady state while the location of the A-locus
is constant from the beginning. In light of Lemma 2 and Proposition 2, item (ii,b), the
B-locus is always below the A-locus. If
π̄At
π̄Bt
declines (increases) during the transition, the
B-locus moves upwards (downwards) and the extrinsic survival component of children
living in region B catches up (declines) relative to region A. If the B-locus moves down-
wards or is already relatively low due to a large difference in π̄At and π̄
B
t , the B-locus may
be located below the 45-degree line such that relative human capital of this population
16The assumption that agents with average human capital live in region A is not harmful: if they
were allocated to the B-region, xi,Bt would evolve according to (24) and x
i,A
t would then be positively
influenced by the survival differential between the A and the B region. Moreover, note that the region to
the left of the unstable steady state is empirically irrelevant since it exceeds the maximal possible number
of children over the life course by far.
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group would approach zero within finite time.
Given Lemma 1 and 2, type-B agents exhibit a higher fertility and lower investments in
education per child. Furthermore, the forces of the quality quantity trade-off are am-
plified via a relatively level of human capital, i.e. xi,Bt < 1. Therefore, relative human
capital xi,Bt is evolving at a slower pace over time compared to region A. Moreover, in
the long-run, agents of region B will converge to a lower relative human capital stock
compared to region-A agents, i.e. xi,B∗ < x
i,A
∗ = 1 [see Proposition 2, item (ii)].
Differences in π̄j∗ between the two regions are responsible for long-run differences in rela-
tive human capital endowments. This implication holds even though children’s survival
probabilities (πi,jt ) may approach one. If the B-locus is increasing during the transition,
survival probabilities are equal to 1 in both regions within finite time. Nevertheless, dif-
ferences in π̄jt persist and translate into different expenditures on child quality affecting
the growth performance of the economy. Hence, environmental conditions translate into
parental decisions to invest in child quality although survival probabilities are high. This
explains the significant but less pronounced link between exposure to pollutants and birth
outcomes in developed countries today. Moreover, π̄jt affects the willingness to pay for
tax-financed abatement measures.
Proposition 3 (Effect of π̄jt on the preferred tax rate)
The preferred tax rate of a pivotal agent τ p,jt in region j = A,B, is inversely related to








given the sufficient condition








For the proof, see the Online-Appendix.
The last proposition states that the pivotal agent’s willingness to pay for tax-financed
abatement measures is inversely related to the external survival component of children’s
probability to survive childhood given that her income (ypt ) is sufficiently high, i.e. (27) is
fulfilled. As π̄jt as well as
Ht
Yt








< 0 will hold for all income classes within finite time. Nevertheless,
owed to the hierarchy of needs, richer agents may prefer a higher tax rate although they
are less exposed to pollutants (see item (i) of Proposition 1). Whether or not this is the














and thus on the level of ypt and
π̄
j
t . Propositions 1 and 3 have interesting policy implications: high inequality implies
that the pivotal agent of a democracy (median voter) would be a region-B agent. This
agent would prefer zero taxes if his income falls below the critical income level (ỹ) as
defined by Proposition 1, while a richer region-A agent may prefer a positive tax rate.
Thus, during the transition, full democratization may be harmful for the environment
and human capital accumulation, if inequality is comparatively high and the median
voter relatively poor, unless democratization is accompanied by redistribution schemes.
4. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
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We now turn to numerical experiments in order to investigate (1) the impact of inequality
on the evolution of child mortality differentials. (2) We look at the impact of pollution on
inequality and finally we explore the consequences of different levels of preferred abate-
ment measures on the evolution on mortality differentials and inequality. Parameters of
the model are set, such that the balanced growth path of the model fits to empirical ob-
servations of the US economy and United Nations long-run projections (de la Croix and
Doepke 2003,2004; Strulik 2004,2008; Schaefer, 2014). A sketch of the numerical method,
a discussion of the parameters, as well as further details about the equilibrium can be
found in the Online-Appendix.
(1) Increase in initial inequality
As π̄At > π̄
B
t , population groups converge to different steady states characterized by
xA∗ = 1 > x
B





imply that type-B agents invest less in child quality, face higher child mortality rates
and exhibit a higher number of births compared to type-A agents. Consequently, income
inequality and the mortality differential between region B and A expressed as (1− πBt )−
(1 − πAt ) = πAt − πBt increases. As incomes grow also poorer households increase their
expenditures on health and nutrition, such that reinforced by the adoption of tax-financed
abatement measures mortality differentials begin to shrink. This process is mirrored
by a hump-shaped evolution of pollutants owed to a higher willingness to support tax-
financed abatement measures. Reduced child mortality rates leave, on the other hand,
more space for expenditures on child quality, such that the population’s growth rate
peaks. Now the incomes of poorer households experience higher growth rates and the
evolution of income inequality follows also a Kuznets curve .17 Thus our model is able to
trace the hump-shaped evolution of mortality differentials between regions characterized
by different degrees of environmental degradation as it has been illustrated by Figure 1
(see solid lines in Figure 4).
17Historical values of the Gini coefficient for the UK can be found in Milanovic et al. (2010) and Cribb
(2013): 45.9 (1759), 51.2 (1801), 57.7 (1867), 52 (1880), 25 (1979), 36 (2007).
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a) mortality differential b) pollution c) Gini (income)
πA − πB P Gini
t t t
Figure 4: Baseline scenario: solid line; higher initial inequality: dashed line.
Higher initial inequality in human capital (dashed lines in Figure 4) implies that more
households are living in region B,18 such that more households are subject to π̄Bt < π̄
A
t
and a reduced xit. Consequently, more households face lower survival probabilities of
their children and devote less of their incomes to expenditures on child quality. Initially,
mortality differentials may fall short of the baseline scenario because of lower levels of pro-
duction. Associated lower income growth rates reduce expenditures on children’s health
and nutrition, such that the peak of the mortality differential is delayed.19 Less abatement
implies that pollutants peak at a higher level while slower income growth and lower av-
erage expenditures on child quality imply a higher peak in the Gini coefficient. Long-run
inequality increases as well because more households are exposed to a higher pollution
level which reduces their willingness to pay for child quality but increases their desired
family size. Thus, higher initial inequality increases the mortality differential between
both regions and reduces long-run growth.
(2) Pollution and inequality
a) Higher initial pollution (P0 ↑) - Both regions are adversely affected by the increase
in pollutants, but region A is less exposed compared to B. Hence, π̄At is reduced rela-
tive to π̄Bt by a lower extend, such that mortality differentials increase (see Figure 5). A
smaller extrinsic component of children’s survival probabilities in both regions reduces
expenditures on child quality. Thus, income inequality falls short of the baseline scenario.
These effects are transitory only, because the economy converges to the same steady state.
18We keep the mean of the initial distribution constant.
19For higher initial inequality or higher adverse impacts of production on pollution, mortality differen-
tials exceed also the initial levels of the baseline scenario.
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a) mortality differential b) pollution c) Gini (income)
πA − πB P Gini
t t t
Figure 5: Baseline scenario: solid line; higher initial pollution: dashed (dotted) line.
b) Higher adverse impact of production on the environment (b2 ↑) - The marginal
benefit of tax-financed abatement measures shrinks, such that the preferred tax rate is
reduced. Hence, the level of pollutants increases (see Figure 6) which adversely affects the
extrinsic component of children’s survival probability. Since region-B agents face a higher
exposure to pollutants compared to region-A agents, π̄B experiences a stronger reduction
than π̄A and mortality differentials increase compared to the reference scenario.
a) mortality differential b) pollution c) Gini (income)
πA − πB P Gini
t t t
Figure 6: Baseline scenario: solid line; higher impact of pollution: b2 +10% dashed line.
The asymmetric reduction in the extrinsic component of children’s survival probability
translates into a stronger reduction in expenditures for children’s education in region B,
such that inequality rises, population growth increases and economic growth is reduced.20
(3) Different taxes
20The case of higher (lower) exposure to pollutants in B (A) is similar and can found in the Online-
Appendix.
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a) mortality differential b) pollution c) population growth
d) Gini (income) e) taxes f) average education




Figure 7: τAt is implemented: solid line; τ
B
t is implemented: dashed line; A finances the
preferred abatement level of B until t = 7 then regime switch to τBt : dotted line.
a) Population group B is pivotal - Region-B agents are poorer but more exposed
to pollutants, such that their preferred tax may exceed τAt (see Figure 7). Higher abate-
ment reduces pollution and the mortality differentials between both regions. As the gap
between the extrinsic survival components is reduced, parents in region B increase their
expenditures on children’s education relative to region A, such that income inequality is
reduced.
b) Progressive taxation and group B is pivotal - Region-B’s preferred amount
of abatement is financed by population group A. This reduces available incomes there
but increases incomes in region B. Hence, the mortality differentials between the two
regions are further reduced. On the other hand, population growth increases because of
higher available incomes and higher survival probabilities in region B. As a consequence
production grows at a lower rate, such that the level of pollutants is (slightly) lower as
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well. Income inequality is initially reduced, but mainly because average expenditures on
education have shrunk. As soon as mortality differentials begin to close, the reduced ex-
penditures on education in B induce an increase in income inequality above the reference
scenario. As growing incomes increase the preference for abatement, the tax burden for
the richer agents continues to rise hampering their capital accumulation and labour sup-
ply which adversely affects the wage rate and lifetime utility of all agents. Thus, lifetime
utility in this tax regime may fall short of the level obtained under a), such that in later
stages of economic development population group B would prefer to switch to regime a)
rather than passing on their preferred level of abatement to the rich. As the economy
switches to a) and τBt is implemented, the tax falls short of the level obtained in a) because
of a lower pollution level and converges from below to its steady state level. The economy
converges now with increasing average expenditures on eduction and declining population
growth towards the steady state obtained in a). The boost in expenditures on education
increases inequality further and overshoots during the transition the corresponding level
of the baseline scenario. Note that we assumed a very progressive taxation scheme in the
sense that B contributes nothing and A everything. A milder scheme would allow for a
lower degree of progression rather than switching to regime a), but the qualitative results
would remain intact. Moreover, the timing of the regime switch depends on how rich
population group B compared to A is and thus on inequality. Higher inequality delays
the regime switch.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We argued that the transition from high child mortality rates to increasing investments in
education, low fertility and low mortality rates required the establishment of tax-financed
abatement measures aimed at an attenuation of the adverse effects of production on
children’s health. Agents’ willingness to support this policies in turn is predominantly
driven by their exposure to pollutants and their disposable incomes. Therefore, inequality
matters along two dimensions: (1) richer households tend to spent more on child quality
and (2) are due to a greater residential distance to emission sources less exposed to
pollutants.
Higher incomes increase the willingness to pay for tax-financed abatement measures but
a lower exposure to pollutants reduces it. This mechanism implies, on the other hand,
that poorer households being more exposed to pollutants may prefer a lower level of
abatement compared to the rich if their income is sufficiently low. In the long-run, the
preferred tax rate is increasing in the exposure to pollutants and poorer households may
prefer a higher level of abatement than richer households. If this is the case, the adverse
effect of pollution on health is highest, if political institutions are biased towards the
rich because the least affected population group prefers the lowest level of tax-financed
abatement measures. Political reforms are indicated under this circumstances because
economic inequality interacts with social segregation and political inequalities implying
differentials in health (Deaton, 2003; Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999). Szreter and
Mooney(1998) argued that the key to understanding the mortality transition in England
lies in local politics. Only after political reform (Reform Acts), political inequality (and
potentially income inequality) was reduced, and issues as sanitation, public health and
the fragile onset of abatement measures in the production sector became topics of high(er)
priority in the agendas of (local) policies.
The described mechanisms provide a candidate explanation for: (1) the hump-shaped
evolution of child mortality ratios between areas that are subject to different degrees of
20
environmental pollution, and (2) The observed positive cross-country correlation between
economic inequality and pollution at the local level.
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